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1 Introduction
Market failure in natural disaster insurance is widely recognized. Gollier (2005) discusses
aspects that lead to a breakdown of e¢ cient risk sharing, such as asymmetric information,
limited liability of insurance companies and the suboptimal possibility of time diversication
of insurers. Recommended policy options in most cases include some sort of public sector
intervention. Of particular interest are the ideas that [t]he existence of extensive bank-
ruptcy costs on nancial markets implies that catastrophe risks cannot be insured without
the government playing the role of reinsurer of last resort.(Gollier, 2005, p. 11) and that
...the state may be in a better situation to organize time diversication.(Gollier, 2005, p.
16). Both statements indicate an active role of the public sector in disaster insurance.
In practice this does indeed seem to be the case. Von Ungern-Sternberg (2004) discusses
natural disaster insurance in ve European countries (England, Spain, France, Switzerland
and Germany). The scope of public intervention ranges from laissez-faire in England
to state owned monopoly in Spain and parts of Switzerland, via the abolition of state
monopolies in Germany and public reinsurance in France. In the USA, both the federal
and state governments participate in the provision of natural disaster insurance. Examples
are the federal National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), the Citizens Property Insurance
Corporation in Florida and the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (FHCF), and the
California Earthquake Authority (CEA).
In this paper we argue that issues of risk selection should be a major concern in the
design of private-public partnerships for catastrophe insurance, with signicant nancial
consequences for the taxpayer. By risk selection we mean a situation where private insurers
can pass on mainly the high risks to the public part of the private-public partnership.1
Insurers obviously have every incentive to keep mainly the good risks for themselves, if
the institutional framework is designed in such a way that they can thereby increase their
expected prots. Risk selection can arise both in situations where the public sector provides
direct insurance for risks the private insurers do not want to cover, and when the public
sector provides reinsurance to the private insurers.
Currently, existing natural disaster insurance schemes are under nancial distress in a
number of countries (such as France or the U.S.). Furthermore, many countries do not
1Our denition is similar to the one used by the World Health Organization, applied to a context of public
sector participation. (A) process whereby an insurer tries to attract people with a lower-than-average
expected risk ...and deter those with a higher-than-average expected risk in order to increase prots; the
process can be explicit or covert(www.euro.who.int). We do not use the term adverse selection, since this is
generally associated with asymmetric information in the litterature. We think that asymmetric information
is not fundamentally important for natural disaster insurance and abstract from this in our model.
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have an adequate system of protection against the nancial and economic consequences of
natural disasters. The call for reforms of existing, or implementation of new, institutional
frameworks for natural disaster insurance is evident.2
In order to demonstrate the potential for risk selection and its signicant nancial im-
plications we build a simple model of a natural disaster insurance market with reinsurance.
The model framework is based on the institutional setting of the French natural disaster
insurance (assurance catastrophe naturelle) as it was initially set up and captures its
essential features: reinsurance cover provided by a publicly owned reinsurance company at
a unique (and risk independent) premium rate across the whole country. We show that
specialization of insurers into homogeneous portfolios is a likely equilibrium outcome. This
implies a tendency towards risk selection and a nancially unsustainable situation for the
reinsurance company. We then explore the possible policy alternatives within the model to
deal with risk selection, including premium increases and limiting the degree of reinsurance.
We next study whether our simple model may shed some light on the observed de-
velopments of the French system since its creation in 1982. Note that the public-private
partnership is sometimes praised as a successful one (see e.g. Michel-Kerjan, 2001, or Gol-
lier, 2005). As such, it is likely to be considered as a potential example to reform existing
disaster insurance systems in other countries or as a guideline to create new systems. We
nd that the French system exhibits the main characteristics of the equilibrium outcome
described in our model, and that the policy reactions of the authorities are very similar to
the ones our model suggests might be used to reduce the degree of risk selection. We then
provide an outlook for the future sustainability of the system. We conclude that risk selec-
tion is likely to continue to be an important issue within the French system. The system
has already needed to be renanced at a substantial cost to the taxpayer and it seems likely
that the same might reoccur in the (not so distant) future.
Finally, we briey discuss two public-private partnership settings that deal e¤ectively
with the issue of risk selection. In Florida (USA), risk selection in hurricane insurance
is alleviated through the availability of post event assessments to the public insurer and
reinsurer. These assessments allow spreading the losses among a large number of policy
holders. In Spain, catastrophe insurance is e¤ectively provided via a public monopoly.
Both Floridas and Spains institutional settings are under attack from forces wanting a
2This was dramatically illustrated by the 2004 Tsunami-earthquake in Southeast Asia, or, for that matter,
by 2005 hurricane Katrinain the United States. Kunreuther (2006) presents recommendations to reform
natural disaster insurance for the U.S. It is noteworthy that the problems of risk selection we focus on here
are entirely absent of his discussion of the relevant issues.
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larger role for private insurance providers. To the extent such reforms are being considered,
the extent to which they might give rise to problems of risk selection should be carefully
considered.
The role of the public sector in the provision of natural disaster insurance has been
recognized as early as the 1970s (e.g. Kunreuther, 1974). Ja¤ee and Russell (1997, p.205)
argue that, despite the potential to increase private sector participation in natural disaster
insurance, the government will continue to be an essential player in catastrophe insurance
markets. Lewis and Murdock (1996) discuss reinsurance of natural disasters, indicating
that the public sector can exploit intertemporal diversication to complement the private
insurance market. A point similar to the one outlined by Gollier (2005). Rather than
contributing to this direction of research, we take the role of the public sector as given and
analyze potential consequences in terms of risk selection.
It is in the area of health insurance that risk selection has been most extensively dis-
cussed. Newhouse (1996) presents a good early survey of the main issues in the health
insurance market both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. More recently,
some empirical papers have attempted to assess whether risk selection is indeed present in
health insurance or not. The evidence seems to be mixed: on the one hand, Polsky and
Nicholson (2004, p. 21) nd no evidence that HMO plans attract a disproportionate share
of low-risk enrollees. On the other hand, Nicholson et al. (2004) nd risk selection for
employer-sponsored plans. Shen and Ellis (2002), using simulation methods, nd that risk
selection can remain protable for insurers even after the implementation of risk-adjustment
formulas, while Lehmann and Zweifel (2003) document that risk selection partly explains
the cost advantages of HMOs.
In the reminder of this paper we rst present a simple model of risk selection in natural
disaster insurance with a public reinsurer. In Section 3 we discuss the policy options
available within the model. We then present with some detail the French natural disaster.
Finally, we briey discuss hurricane insurance in Florida and catastrophe insurance in Spain.
Section 4 ends with some concluding remarks.
2 A Simple Model of Risk Selection
In this section we present a highly stylized model of a natural disaster insurance market
with reinsurance. The framework is inspired by the French system of disaster insurance
(assurance catastrophe naturelle), i.e. the assumptions are chosen so as to capture the es-
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sential characteristics of the French system. We discuss in later sections how the framework
could be extended to other institutional settings.
Consider a country with two regions of equal size i 2 [H;L]. Each region has a stock
of H houses. Without loss of generality, the value of a house is normalized to 1. We
assume that a region is subdivided into a nite number of counties, each with housing stock
M. A county can be a¤ected by damage, which destroys the hosing stock in that county
completely, i.e. the damage value isM. Damage occurrence for each county in region i is
assumed to follow a binomial distribution with the probability of damage equal to pi. We
assume that damage occurrence is independent both among counties and among regions.
Hence, for each region the expected damage is Hpi. Regions di¤er only in the respective
probability of an event occurring, with the H-region having a higher probability of damage
than the L-region (pH > pL).
Housing insurance is compulsory, and its price is xed at a rate  independent of pi.
Insurance is provided by identical insurers in a competitive market. The equilibirium con-
cept is that of symmetric, free-entry equilibrium. Whenever an insurer j decides to sell
insurance in a particular region i, its market share will be given by 1=Ni, where Ni is the
number of insurers active in the region.3
There exists a single reinsurance company which o¤ers proportional reinsurance con-
tracts to the market in all regions. Reinsurance is voluntary, and each insurer can decide
on the fraction of the portfolio that it wants to reinsure. We denote by rj 2 [0; 1] the rate
of retention for insurer j.4 An insurer can reinsure only its entire portfolio and therefore
can choose only one level of rj , even when active in both regions.5
The premium income from the fraction (1  rj) of the portfolio that is reinsured is
divided as follows. The insurer keeps a percentage  to cover administrative costs and
passes on (1   ) to the reinsurance company. For the remaining portfolio, the insurer
keeps the full premium income. The reinsurer covers the fraction (1  rj) of total claims
payments. In terms of a particular house in region i, revenue for insurer j from signing a
natural disaster insurance contract can be expressed by the following random variable:
Revj (i) =
8<:  + rj(1  ) + rj [(1  )  1] with prob:
(1  pi)
pi
3We work with free-entry equilibria to make the model simple. If the number of rms is xed, they would
earn positive prots (see discussion below).
4Hence (1  rj) is the fraction of the portfolio that is reinsured.
5A unique rate of reinsurance is standard in the industry.
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The insurer is certain to obtain  for each house it has under contract. Further, with
probability (1   pi) the house does not su¤er a damage. The insurer then receives the
remaining premium income for the fraction of retained risks (rj). With probability pi the
house is destroyed (damage value equals 1) and net revenueto the insurer is the fraction
of remaining premium income minus the fraction of damage that the insurance company
bears.
For the direct insurers all costs other than claims payments are assumed to be xed.
We consider two types of xed costs. A region specic xed cost (f) and a country specic
xed cost (F ). Regional costs represent, for example, branch activities. For simplicity
we assume that regional xed costs (f) are the same in both regions. The cost of claims
settlement is assumed to be equal to zero.6 F represents the fact that some costs, such
as setting up a countrywide representation, must be incurred independently of the number
of regions covered. The country specic xed cost (F ) plays a crucial role in this model.
Without it, there would be no incentive for an insurer to serve both regions. In fact, in the
absence of F and under a competitive insurance market characterized by free entry, each
individual insurer will seek a homogeneous risk portfolio in order to choose an optimal rate
of retention. Only through the introduction of country xed costs might an insurer actually
want to provide service in both regions.
Insurers are risk averse. Insurer j maximizes expected utility choosing the optimal rate
of retention rj
max
rj
E [u (j)] = E [j ]  
2
V ar [j ] ; (1)
where j is prot of insurer j, and  is the parameter of risk aversion.7
Additionally to the rate of retention, each insurer can decide where to be active. We
distinguish two types of insurers: A specialist (insurer) serves only one specic region, while
a generalist (insurer) serves both regions. Expressions for expected prots and its variance
are
6One could argue that administrative costs in the H-regions are higher since there will be, on average,
more cases to evaluate and forms to ll out. We abstract from this.
7The assumption of risk averse insurers allows for interior optimal choices for the rate of retention.
Jametti and von Ungern-Sternberg (2004) build a similar model with risk neutral insurers, leading to binary
choices for rj . Alternatively, Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2008) argue that insurers need to consider
both expected losses and variance of losses when setting insurance premiums.
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E [j ] =
H
Ni
[ + rj ( (1  )  pi)]  f   F; (2a)
V ar [j ] = r
2
j
H
Ni
pi (1  pi) ; (2b)
for specialists; and
E [j ] =
8<: HNL [ + rj ( (1  )  pL)]+ HNH [ + rj ( (1  )  pH)]  2f   F; (3a)
V ar [j ] = r
2
j
 H
NL
pL (1  pL) + H
NH
pH (1  pH)

; (3b)
for generalists.
Given the two types of insurers, three equilibrium characterizations are possible: all
insurers are specialists =) a Specialist equilibrium (SE); all insurers are generalists =) a
Generalist equilibrium (GE); both specialists and generalists coexist =) a Hybrid equilib-
rium (HE).
Insurers maximize expected utility, while free-entry determines the number of active
insurers such that expected utility is zero. Since there is no asymmetric information in
the model, the equilibrium concept used is Nash equilibrium. Even though this model
setup appears to be as simple as possible, useful analytic expressions for the equilibrium
conditions for hybrid equilibria are impossible to obtain. For this reason we restrict the
rest of our analysis to Specialist and Generalist equilibria. For each equilibrium candidate
we calculate the conditions such that deviation (D) is not protable. Deviation strategies
are dened by entering or retiring from a particular region choosing the optimal rate of
retention.8 Equilibrium conditions, as well as the expression for the equilibrium rate of
retention and number of insurers, are given in Table 1 where we have used the following
denition:
Denition 1 Risk-adjusted unitary prot (!ij) for insurer j in region i is dened as
!ij =

 + rj [ (1  )  pi]  
2
(rj)
2 pi (1  pi)

: (4)
8Retiring from the market is never a protable deviation, since equilibria are characterized by zero
expected utility.
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Figure 1, below, illustrates the equilibrium conditions in the -pH space for two possible
equilibrium outcomes.9 The shaded area to the left corresponds to generalist equilibria with
interior rates of retention, while the area to the right represents specialist equilibria with full
reinsurance in the high probability region. The line GE cond represents situations where the
generalist equilibrium condition from Table 1 holds with equality; similarly the line SE cond
represents situations where the specialist equilibrium condition holds; nally, the third line
represent points where rH = 0 (i.e specialists in the H-region choose full reinsurance). Note
that in the remaining areas of the graph other equilibrium characterizations would apply
(such as hybrid equilibria or specialist equilibria with an interior rate of retention also in
the H-region).10
The graph illustrates that the area of GE exists mainly for small di¤erences in damage
probabilities across regions. On the other hand, the (particular) specialist equilibrium
occurs for high di¤erences in damage probabilities. More formally we have the following
result:
Proposition 1 Assume rj < 1 at least for some insurers and damage probabilities are such
that there exist premium rates () where some insurers choose to become specialists.
Then discrete changes in  will eventually lead to more specialization by insurers.
The proof is illustrated in Figure 1.11
The proposition characterizes the fundamental trade-o¤ in the model: for small prob-
ability di¤erences, the incentive to distribute the country xed cost between two regions
prevails (generalist insurers), while for larger di¤erences the incentive to optimally set the
rate of retention dominates (specialist insurers). Moving north-east in the graph implies
thus the following: either some (or all) insurers decide to become specialists, or the premium
rate is su¢ ciently high such that rj = 1 for all insurers.
We are now in the position to analyze the problem of risk selection within the model.
Risk selection a¤ects the situation of the reinsurance company. It may end up with a
disproportionate share of risks from the high probability region in its portfolio.
Denition 2 We dene the degree of risk selection as the number of high risks divided by
9Without loss of generality we dene pH and pL in terms of a mean preserving spread p =
pH+pL
2
,
which implies that high values of pH correspond to large di¤erences in the damage probabilities between
the regions. We assume  to be at least actuarially fair.
10 Indeed, our model satises the conditions of Proposition 8.D.3 of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
(1995) implying existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
11A formal prove is available upon request. Jametti and von Ungern-Sternberg (2004) obtain similar
results.
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the number of low risks that are reinsured.
 =
(1  rH) NSHNSH+NG + (1  rG)
NG
NSH+NG
(1  rL) NSLNSL+NG + (1  rG)
NG
NSL+NG
 1 (5)
where NSH represents the number of specialists in the high probability region, etc.
The numerator consists of a weighted average of the rate of reinsurance in the H-region
of specialists (1  rH) and generalists (1  rG), weighted by the percentage of insurers of
each type in this region. The denominator is the equivalent expression for the L-region.
A value of  = 1 implies that the reinsurer has a balanced portfolio (the same percentage
of reinsurance in both regions. Values of  > 1 imply a certain degree of risk selection.12
Full risk selection, a situation where the reinsurer only reinsures risks from the H-region
implies a value of  =1.
We are also interested in the expression for the expected prots of the reinsurer. For
this we assume that the reinsurer does not incur costs other than the claims payments.
Expected prots are then given by
R =
X
i
X
j
Nij
NiS +NiG
H (1  rij) [ (1  )  pi] : (6)
For example, in the case of a generalist equilibrium this expression reduces to
R = H (1  rG) [( (1  )  pL) + ( (1  )  pH)] :
Figure 2 takes up our example of generalist and specialist equilibrium areas and illus-
trates the outcome in terms of our measure of risk selection () and expected prots of the
reinsurer (R), for premium rates that are at least actuarially fair.
Quite naturally, in the case of a generalist equilibrium, there is no risk selection. How-
ever, it must be noted that an important part of the area is in situations where the reinsur-
ance company is not nancially viable. Indeed, the horizontal line indicates points where
( (1  )  pL) + ( (1  )  pH) = 0, i.e. below this line the reinsurer is not nancially
viable even in a case where it receives the entire housing portfolio. For the upper left part
of the GE-area, R can be positive or negative. The intuition behind this result is straight-
forward. If the premium rate is su¢ ciently low so that the insurers can make little prot
even on the low risks (in excess of the share of premiums they keep to cover their admin-
istrative costs) then they will purchase full reinsurance. However, the premium income for
12Values of  < 1 do not occur in equilibrium.
9
the reinsurer might then not be su¢ ciently high to cover its expected claims payments.
In the case of a specialist equilibrium, there is always a certain degree of risk selection
( > 1). Specialist insurers in the H-region will have a lower rate of retention (a higher rate
of reinsurance) than their counterparts in the L-region. In the specic case displayed in
Figure 2, the SE-area corresponds to a situation with full risk selection, where specialists
in the H-region fully reinsure and those in the L-region fully retain their risks. In such a
situation, the expected prot of the reinsurer must be negative.
Proposition 2 Assume rj < 1 at least for some insurers and damage probabilities are such
that there exist premium rates () where some insurers choose to become specialists.
Then discrete changes in () will eventually lead to more risk selection (higher ) and
losses for the reinsurer (R  0)
The proof is illustrated in Figure 2.
Thus, a move north-east in the graph implies a higher degree of risk selection (as long as
there is any reinsurance), and this situation eventually leads to a worsening of the nancial
situation of the reinsurance company.
In conclusion, risk selection is an important feature of our model unless the country
specic xed costs are very large. It is particularly important in situations where there are
signicant di¤erences in the damage probabilities across regions.
3 Discussion
3.1 Policy options within the model
One could argue that risk-dependent premium rates are an easy and immediate solution
to risk selection within the model. This might be a somewhat fast conclusion. On the one
hand, it is generally recognized that it is di¢ cult to exactly measure the risk exposure for
natural disasters given their characteristics of low probability high impact. Kunreuther and
Michel-Kerjan (2008) show that insurers require signicant premium increases in situations
of parameter uncertainty. On the other hand, the same authors argue convincingly, that
high risk exposure can a¤ect the credit rating of an insurers, thus increasing the cost of
capital for the entire portfolio. This in turn implies that load factors, i.e. premiums above
actuarially fair rates, increase with risk exposure.
Hence, risk-dependent premium rates do not automatically imply a generalist equilib-
rium outcome. It might be that premium rates, although di¤erentiated across regions, are
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such that insurers still have the incentive to specialize into one region. The problem of risk
selection then remains. Furthermore, signicantly higher charges in disaster prone areas
might not be politically feasible.13
A uniform increase in the premium rate might not be an adequate solution for two
reasons: rst, it might actually worsen the problem of risk selection, as a higher premium
rate increases the incentive of insurers to specialize into a homogeneous risk portfolio (see
Proposition 2); second, increasing premium rates, in particular increasing premium rates
above actuarially fair rates, comes at a cost to the nal customer, who pays an ever higher
price for the service.14 In our model, due to the free-entry assumption, higher premium
rates translate into a higher number of insurers in the market, which creates an ine¢ ciency
since regional and country xed costs are multiplied.
Within the model, a more adequate policy mix would consist of two measures: increase
the premium rate and make a substantial rate of reinsurance compulsory. The problem of
risk selection is created by the possibility of insurers to serve only the low risk customers,
buy little reinsurance and make prots on these low risk customers. The model shows that
insurers have an incentive to do so. If these insurers are forced to reinsure a substantial
part of their portfolio, the cost for them of accepting some high risk customers will fall, and
this leads to a reduction in the degree of risk selection ().
3.2 The case of France
3.2.1 The institutional framework
Natural disaster insurance was introduced in France in 1982 as a reaction to a severe ood
a few months earlier. The term natural disaster (catastrophe naturelle) is not dened in
the law creating the system.15 A commission, formed of representatives of the Ministries
of Interior, Finance and Environment, has to decide whether a given occurrence is deemed
13More generally, redistribution towards people living in high damage areas seems acceptable to most
societies worldwide. Otherwise it would be di¢ cult to explain the signicant public and private disaster
relief spending. Frame (2001) shows that redistribution towards households in disaster prone areas might
be benecial also to households in safe areas. In this spirit, it would be interesting to build a more general
model that endogenizes the choice of the institutional framework including, for example, equity aspects to
argue in favour of a uniform premium rate. We leave these considerations for future research.
14Jametti and von Ungern-Sternberg (2004) provide an analysis of the cost of service provision in their
model. They calculate social cost as the sum of the reinsurers losses and premium payment (free entry
implies zero prots for insurers). They nd that increasing the premium rate in a situation of risk selection
is signicantly more costly relative to a situation of full reinsurance.
15The description below is drawn from von Ungern-Sternberg (2004). Additional information was obtained
from a letter by the CEO of the public reinsurer to a private insurer dated in October 1996 (CCR, 1996).
The letter is written in French, any translations in this paper have been done by the authors, which are not
certied translators. Copies of this letter can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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a natural disaster and hence makes claimants eligible for reimbursement. The conditions
of insurance (in particular premium rates and excesses) are xed by decree and uniform
across the country.16 Insurance is compulsory, presumably to reduce problems of adverse
selection among property owners. Similarly, all insurance companies o¤ering (other types
of) property insurance in a specic area are obliged to include protection against natural
disasters. Premium rates are dened as a percentage of other property insurance premiums
(in particular re), while excesses (for non-commercial buildings) are xed per contract and
per event.17
An important institutional feature of the system is the existence of a publicly owned
reinsurance company, the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR). Reinsurance is not com-
pulsory, and insurers are free to contract with other, private, reinsurance companies. Rein-
surance with the state reinsurance company is, however, potentially attractive, both because
the reinsurance premiums charged are low and because it can o¤er unlimited cover (it is
covered by a state guarantee). Insurance companies that decide to reinsure with the public
reinsurer are o¤ered two types of contracts; proportional contracts (for a given percentage
of premium income the reinsurance company covers a given percentage of claims) and stop-
loss contracts (the reinsurance company covers all claims that exceed a given multiple of
annual premium income).
The initial conditions of insurance were the following: The premium rate was set at
5.5% of the basic housing insurance contract, and excesses for a residential structure were
FF 800 (e124). The basic CCR conditions were: for proportional contracts insurers could
choose any rate of reinsurance between 40% and 90%. Stop-loss contracts were only o¤ered
to insurers that also participated in the proportional contract. Conditions for the stop-loss
contracts were negotiated on a case by case basis. Furthermore, the CCR o¤ered the private
insurers a commission for administrative expenses of 24% of the reinsured premium income.
3.2.2 The main changes to the system since its creation
There have been four major changes to the system since its creation in 1982.
16The uniform premium rate and insurance conditions are a fundamental cornerstone of the system,
presumably as a result of equity concerns. It should be noted that so far no-one has advocated changing
this feature.
17One could argue that it is impossible to treat the natural disaster insurance market independently
from other housing insurance, since these contracts are sold together. We would argue that this is not the
case. It is easily conceivable that losses in the natural disaster segment drive an insurer out of a particular
region, even if premium income from this segment is relatively small. Imagine a region where the basic
housing insurance is delivered in a competitive market with no returns to scale. Clearly, an insurer would
opt not to provide insurance in a situation where the disaster insurance incurrs losses, even if the fraction
of premium income from this segment is small.
12
In 1983, i.e. just one year after its creation, the premium rates for buildings were
increased by more than 50% (from 5.5% to 9%). At the same time the excesses were also
revised upwards (from FF800 to FF1500).
In 1990 the French overseas districts (Départements Outre Mer, DOM, e.g. Guadeloupe,
Martinique) were included in the natural disaster insurance scheme. Insurers had to provide
disaster insurance if they wanted to operate in the DOM. The private insurers accepted this
introduction only under the condition that these territories could be reinsured separately
from the mainland portfolio. The legislator and the CCR accepted this condition.
In 1996, after its reserves had dwindled to less than e300 million (2 billion FF), the CCR
substantially revised its reinsurance conditions. The range for the proportional reinsurance
rate was reduced to a rate between 40% (minimum unchanged) and 60% (maximum reduced
by 30 percentage points). The minimum retention rate for the insurers in the proportional
reinsurance cover was thus increased from 10% to 40%. For insurers with a high share
of industrial risks, the maximum rate was further limited to 40%, i.e. their compulsory
retention rate was xed at 60%. The possibilities to obtain stop-loss cover were also reduced.
The minimum loss for the insurer before the stop-loss could come into play was increased
to equal 100% of the insurers total (gross) premium income. For small insurers or insurers
with a bad risk portfolio (mainly industrial risks or risks in the DOM), the minimum excess
was even higher. Finally, the commission to cover administrative costs varied, according to
the historic claims/premium ratio of the insurers, between 18% and 24%.
In spite of these changes the CCR was virtually bankrupt by the end of the year 1999.
The resulting bail-out by the government was accompanied by a major nancial reorganisa-
tion. The premium rate was increased by one third (from 9% to 12%) and the excesses were
multiplied by a factor of (approximately) 2.18 The commission for administrative costs was
entirely abolished.19
The rate of proportional reinsurance was xed at 50%, i.e. the maximal and minimal
rates are now equal. If the insurance companies wish to continue obtaining separate cover
for their risks situated in the DOM, they can do so only at the cost of accepting a substantial
excess (1600% of annual premium income) on those risks.
18The factor is less than 2 for damage due to ooding, and more than 6 for damage due to subsidence.
19The 24% commission in France should be compared with the commission of just 5% paid by the Con-
sorcio in Spain.
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3.2.3 Does the model apply to the case of France?
We would argue that risk selection is a fundamental aw that lead to the virtual collapse
of the system by the year 2000. Our conjecture is supported by the fact that most of
the changes outlined above coincide with the policy recommendations emanating from our
model to reduce risk selection. Ideally, one would like to analyse these issues on the basis of
individual rm data, in particular to obtain an empirical measure of . Unfortunately, no
rm-level data is available, and we have to limit ourselves to the interpretation of system-
wide information.
Before turning to the specic aspects of the development of the disaster insurance system
it is important to appreciate that the institutional setup, which combines proportional and
stop-loss contracts, implies the CCR will bear most of the cost when a large-scale disaster
occurs. If the reinsurer is unable to accumulate su¢ cient reserves to face spikesin damage
payments, this will trigger the state guarantee. Hence, the tax payer might end up paying
the bill of a large disaster, or a series of large disasters.
Let us now turn to the overall nancial performance of the system. Table 2 presents
information of the rst 20 years of existence of the natural disaster insurance. The rst
column of data presents the industry claims-premium (C/P) ratio. Over the period 1982-
2001 the average C/P ratio was 58%, with important yearly variation due to the infrequent
occurrence of natural disasters. This is in line with other segments of the insurance industry.
However, the crucial di¤erence is that within the French system, where natural disaster
contracts are compulsory and an add-on to basic housing insurance contracts, acquisition
and administrative costs should be very low.
The second column gives an estimate of the overall protability (including capital in-
come) of the system. The methodology used for this computation is detailed in Appendix
A1. Accumulated system-wide prots over the rst 20 years are estimated at roughly 7.2
billion e. Column three shows the rate of reinsurance of the private insurers. One can
observe the important drop in the rate of reinsurance from above 80% at the beginning of
the system to 40% (the lowest the CCR would allow, while still o¤ering stop-loss contracts)
by the end of the 1990s. Note that the nal increase in the rate of reinsurance was the
introduction of the unique rate of 50% by the reinsurer.20 Finally, columns four and ve
indicate information on the nancial evolution of the CCR, presenting the ceded premium
income and the evolution of reserves of the public reinsurer.
20The reason why the rate of reinsurance is not exactly equal to 50% is due to the fact that the gures
include insurance/reinsurance of minor items such as vehicles, which are not subject to the 50%-rule.
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Our calculations indicate that despite the system-wide nancial viability, the surplus of
the system was not used to keep the public part of the public-private partnership aoat.
The premium income of the CCR remained fairly stable over time and, more importantly,
the reinsurer was never able to accumulate any signicant reserves. To the contrary: the
reserves of the CCR were drained from over 500 million e in 1992 to practically zero in 1999.
At this point the French government stepped in, renancing the CCR with approximately
450 million e. In spite of the substantial premium hike in 1999 the CCRs reserves were
still only at 427 million e by the end of 2001, i.e. less than the government injection of
funds. To summarize, the entire surplus of the system landed in the pockets of the private
insurers.
Our model highlights that risk selection contributed signicantly to this situation. A
rst point to note is the rapid rise in the retention rate, mentioned above. Two symptoms
would contribute to explaining this development. First, the substantial rise in premium
rates in 1984 made a higher retention rate much more attractive. Second, this same rise in
premium rates and the accompanying reduction in retention rates made it more expensive
to keep high risks on a portfolio of essentially low risks. Specialising on low risk customers,
and retaining all risks, or specialising on high risk customers and reinsuring became much
more protable strategies than o¤ering across-the-board service (Proposition 1). Note that
this is exactly the result of our model, i.e. higher premium rates imply lower rates of
reinsurance and lead to more risk selection (Proposition 2). As mentioned before, we do
not have rm level data to establish whether this is in fact what happened.
All the changes of policies implemented in the insurance system are easily understand-
able if one accepts risk selection to be a problem in the system. They all aim at increasing
the amount of low risks in the portfolio of the reinsurer. They are, indeed, in line with our
policy discussion: increase the premium rate and increase the rate of reinsurance.
Quite obviously, our model abstracts from various points of reality. It is conceivably
possible to build a much more complex model that might explain the outcome in France
without relying on risk selection. In the spirit of Occams razor, we favour our simple and
straightforward explanation.
As a nal point of illustration of the problems of risk selection we quote the communi-
cation of the CCR to the private insurers from 1996, when outlining the situation in the
DOM: The logic of the system requires that there should, at the reinsurance level, be
some degree of coinsurance between the insurers heavily engaged in the DOM and those
that have no contracts in that region. However, the major events like the oodings due to
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the three hurricanes in 1995 have allowed us to establish, that the CCR has had to cover
98% of the costs, i.e for these events 650 million Francs, as compared to 24 million Francs
income in the form of reinsurance premiums. It has thus become necessary to reestablish
an equilibrium that is more acceptable to the market as a whole, by raising the excess of
the non-proportional reinsurance cover to be born by the insurers(CCR, 1996).
3.2.4 An outlook
When trying to assess the e¢ ciency of the system as it now stands, a rst point to emphasise
is that it is getting more and more costly for the houseowner. As shown, the overall system
was economically viable with the premium rates set in 1984. Nevertheless, rates were
increased by one third in the year 2000. The houseowners now have to pay considerably
more for a lower coverage (higher excesses).
Second, while the CCRs premium income more than doubled from 303 million e in
1999 to 680 million e in 2004 (CCR, 2005) its reserves, after increasing to almost 600
million e in 2002, are currently only slightly over 400 million e. This is nowhere near the
amount necessary to cover the reinsurance cost of a major natural disaster.
Finally, it is unclear at what stage a private insurer might decide that it is more prof-
itable to concentrate on the good risks, and stop buying reinsurance cover from the CCR
altogether. There is always the possibility to turn to private competitive reinsurance com-
panies. They may be unwilling to o¤er unlimited reinsurance cover, but it is likely that for
a good portfolio they can o¤er considerably lower costs of reinsurance.
It is by no means certain that the carrot of unlimited reinsurance cover will in the
long run be su¢ cient to limit the extent of risk selection and allow the CCR to reinsure
a su¢ ciently large fraction of the low risks. The lawmaker intended these low risks to
subsidise the system. Their (compulsory) premium payments may however just end up
increasing the prots of the insurance companies.
3.3 Risk selection in other institutional settings
Our model illustrates the importance of carefully taking into account issues of risk selec-
tion when supplying natural disaster insurance via public-private partnerships. We based
our theoretical framework on the institutional setting prevailing in France. It is therefore
di¢ cult to apply our model directly to other institutional settings. Nevertheless, public-
private partnerships do exist in natural disaster insurance in several other countries and
they also are prone to problems of risk selection. We would thus argue that our model helps
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to better understand the structure of these other institutional settings. In the remainder
of this section we illustrate two examples that we think deal successfully with the issue
of risk selection in di¤erent ways. The examples are hurricane insurance in Florida and
catastrophe insurance in Spain.
3.3.1 Florida
A comparable situation of a public-private partnership with a potential issue of risk selec-
tion is hurricane insurance in Florida (USA).21 Besides private sector companies, the two
public institutions directly involved in the sector are the Citizens Property Insurance Cor-
poration (Citizens) a not-for-prot corporation acting as a insurer of last resortand the
Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (Cat Fund) providing reinsurance. The public sector
involvement is a reaction to the unwillingness of private insurance providers to continue
o¤ering hurricane insurance in some areas, notably after hurricane Andrew in 1992.
Participation in the Cat Fund is compulsory for each insurer wishing to provide housing
insurance in the State of Florida. In the basic contract, insurers select a rate of reinsurance
of 45%, 75% and 90% above an individually calculated deductible.22 The deductible roughly
depends on the insurers market share with a system wide deductible of $4.5 billion in 2008.
Guaranteed coverage of the reinsurer depends on: current premium income, accumulated
reserves and a assigned borrowing capacity of the Cat Fund, amounting to roughly $15
billion in 2008. Additionally, insurers can buy, at the same premium rates, additional
coverage up to $12 billion, if they wish to do so. There is no formal government guarantee
for the Fund. Finally, premium rates vary across regions, based on an actuarial evaluation
by an independent consultant. The specicity of the Cat Fund is that it can levy post event
assessments on all property insurance contracts and use these fundds to repay any debts it
may have contracted to cover its reinsurance obligations.
Citizens was created in 2002 from the merger of two existing public insurance providers:
the Florida Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association (JUA) and
the Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association (FWUA).23 Per mandate Citizens o¤ers
property insurance to individuals in good standing who do not have access to insurance in
the private market. Nevertheless, Citizens is supposed to charge premiums that allow it
to cover costs. Further, similar to the Cat Fund in case of a major event the provider is
21The section is drawn, in part, on von Ungern-Sternberg (2009).
22Note that by 2007 only one insurer remained with the option of 75% reinsurance. 32 (15.8%) selected
the 45% and 169 (83.7%) the 90% option.
23The FWUA was created in 1970 already, while the JUA originated only months after Hurricane Andrew.
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allowed to charge ex post assessments to recoup incurred losses. Currently Citizens holds a
market share of roughly 30% (Citizens, 2008).24
The above description shows some similarities with our model: the existence of a publicly
administered reinsurance company o¤ering a choice of proportional reinsurance contracts.
Further, the private sector can pass high risk customers to Citizens, which in turn reinsures
mainly with the Cat Fund.25 Risk selection could be an important concern under these
circumstances.
In the spirit of our model, the possibility to charge risk adjusted premium rates by the
public players should substantially alleviate the issue of risk selection, even if it does not
entirely eliminate it. In fact, it is doubtful that regional premium rates are truly actuarially
fair.
The simple fact that reinsurance with the Cat Fund is compulsory for all insurance
providers strongly indicates that its reinsurance premiums are likely to have a redibstibutive
element from low to high risk properties. Similarly, Citizens premium rate are unlikely to
be actuarially fair because of the (contradicting) mandate of o¤ering a¤ordable, yet cost
e¤ective, insurance.26 (In 2006 Citizens applied for premium increases based on an actuarial
valuation but the Florida legislator imposed a premium freeze until 2010.)
We would argue that the possibilty of charging post event assessments goes a long way
in solving the issue of risk selection. These taxes imply that both Citizens and the Cat Fund
do not need to accumulate important reserve ex ante to face a major hurricane (or a series
of hurricanes), but rather can distribute the cost of a major disaster upon a large number of
(captive) policy holders.27 Note that a private reinsurer does not have this possibility (and
would therfore need to charge much higher premiums to accumulate signicant reserves).
Since the Cat Fund can assess all insurance providers, which are also its clients, ex post
with a proportional tax to recoup its losses,28 it can e¤ectively distribute the surcharge
over a large number of policy holders. The increased cost per policy holder is thus quite
low. The abilty to charge these assessments allow the Cat Fund to keep its reinsurance
premiums and cost of capital low despite the large risk exposure. Both of these factors
contribute signicantly to reducing the cost of reinsurance for the Florida policy holder.
24Thus, Citizens is the largest property insurance provider in the State. Some discussion has arisen as to
whether this qualies still as an insurer of last resort.
25Over 40% of the Cat Funds portfolio is from Citizens (von Ungern-Sternberg, 2009).
26Ja¤ee and Russell (1997, p. 12) note that the JUA, a predecessor of Citizens charged premium rates
based on an artful mix of actuarial science and politics.
27 Indeed, the assessment base both for Citizen and the Cat Fund go beyond housing insurance policies
and include other insurance lines, e.g. car insurance.
28 In order to recover the losses from the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, the Cat Fund implemented a
1% emergency assessment in 2007 for the next eight years.
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Similarly, Citizensassessments allow the public insurer to o¤er fairly low premium rates
to high risk property owners. This has both advantages and disadvantages to the private
sector. On the positive side, Citizens as insurer of last resort, reduces the risk exposure of
private insurers. This lowers the average cost of capital, thus allowing private insurers to
compete more e¤ectively for lower risks. On the negative side, however, Citizens clearly acts
in an uneven palying eld, raising competitive policy concerns. In fact, the possibility to
assess private insurers implies that Citizens can pass part of its cost on to its competitors.
Despite the competition policy concerns, which are non-negligible given the size Citizens
has acquired since its inception, we would argue that the current framework of hurricane
insurance addresses the issue of risk selection quite ingeniously, o¤ering hurricane insurance
at an a¤ordable price to Floridians. There have been recent calls for reform aiming at
reducing the role of the public sector. These reforms should consider the issue of risk
selection very carefully.
3.3.2 Spain
Another solution to the issue of risk selection is presented in the case of natural disaster
insurance in Spain. The publicly owned Consorcio de Compensacion de Segurosis a pure
monopoly. Arguably, the issue of risk selection had an important impact in shaping the
current institutional seting in Spain.
Catastrophe insurance29 in Spain is compulsory. It has to be contracted with the conclu-
sion of most, privately provided, insurance policies, such as re, car insurance etc. Private
insurers act solely as nancial intermediaries and remit all premiums to the Consorcio.
Claims are settled by the Consorcio itself. Premium rates are uniform across the country.
Hence in Spain just as in France, there are major redistributive e¤ects between the low risk
and the high risk areas.30
It is only because of its monopoly status, that risk selection has never been an issue
for the Consorcio. Its benets to the property owners come from the fact that it runs an
extremely e¢ cient organization. Total administrative costs (including a 5% commission to
the insurance companies) represent only 10% of premium income. By comparison, the US
Federal National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has administrative expenses of the order
of 40% of premium income, (including a 35% commission to the insurance companies). A
further indication of the e¤ectivenes of the program is the average claims - premium ratio
29 In the case of Spain this includes extraordinary events such as terrorism.
30Von Ungern-Sternberg (2004) indicates that 65% of damages are concentrated in 5 (out of 50) Provinces.
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for the period 1971 to 1999 which was of the order of 98%.31
Despite o¤ering comprehensive catastrophe insurance at very low cost, the role of the
Consorcio was under heavy attack from the European Union via its third non-life insurance
directive. This directive aimed at eliminating monopolies in the insurance sector. Spain
realized that the absolute monopoly of the Consorcio was essential to avoid issues of risk
selection. It avoided the abolition of the Consorcios monopoly status redening the Con-
sorcios premium rates as indirect taxes. So far the European Union has accepted this
rephrasing(see von Ungern-Sternberg, 2004).
4 Conclusions
Most natural disaster insurance schemes include various degrees of public sector participa-
tion. We argue that in all such situations careful thought should be given to the issue of
risk selection, which we dene as a situation where private insurers pass onthe high risks
to the public part of the partnership, while keeping the low risks for themselves.
To illustrate our concerns we build a simple model of a natural disaster insurance market.
Caracteristics of the model are: a unique and risk-independent premium rate and the
existence of a reinsurer o¤ering proportional contracts. We show that in this framework
risk selection is a likely equilibrium outcome, in particular if there exist signicant regional
di¤erences in damage probabilities. Policies to remedy this situation focus on achieving
a better balanced portfolio for the (public) reinsurer. The assumptions of the model are
chosen so as to capture the essential features of the French natural disaster insurance
system. We note that the evolution of the system over the last 20 years strongly indicate
that problems of risk selection are indeed a major source of nancial instability. In case of
a major event, the taxpayer will end up having to pay for most of the costs.
Using hurricane insurance in Florida and catastrophe insurance in Spain, we further
illustrate that well devised public-private partnerships can solve (or reduce) problems of risk
selection. Of course, the private insurance sectors prots are lower under these institutional
set-ups. It is noteworthy that both examples are under pressure to implement reforms that
give the private part of the partnership a larger role. When discussing these reforms, one
should carefully consider the impact any modication of the system has on the issue of risk
selection.
31Two factors are responsible for this surprisingly high C/P ratio. First, as already mentioned, it has
very low administrative costs. Second it has managed to earn high interest incomes on its reserves during
the periods of high ination.
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A Calculation of system surplus
In this appendix we briey describe our nancial performance evaluation of the natural dis-
aster insurance system in France.32 Data were obtained from the o¢ cial CCR publications
and the IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2004).
We rst calculate the per year gross result of disaster insurance as the di¤erence be-
tween premium income and claims payments. From this we subtract administrative costs,
estimated at 10% of premium income to obtain gross prots of the system. Finally, prots
enter the accumulated system surplus with nancial returns estimated at the government
bond rate of interest.
The claims-premium ratio, the rate of reinsurance and the CCRs reserves are obtained
directly from the o¢ cial publication of the public reinsurer (CCR, various years).
32The detailed table of calculations is available from the authors upon request.
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Table 1
Equilibrium conditions
Equilibrium
Rate of
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Number
of insurers
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Note: The displayed expression for the number of insurers corresponds to an interior solution for the rate
of retention. The deviation strategy (D) in the SE is to become a generalist, while in the GE it is to
reduce service to the L-region.
Table 2
Financial performance of the system
Year
C / P
Ratio
(%)
Acc. system
surplus
(million e)
Rate of
reinsurance
(%)
CCR
premium inc.
(million e)
CCR
Reserves
(million e)
82/83 163 -214 83 243 n.a.
84 5 93 75 297 n.a.
85 3 496 75 335 n.a.
86 12 918 73 341 223
87 36 1,281 52 274 338
88 52 1,618 41 232 424
89 46 2,012 51 234 416
90 99 2,135 43 238 466
91 42 2,638 40 235 483
92 77 2,958 38 234 525
93 116 3,050 41 263 499
94 48 3,547 41 297 406
95 91 3,800 45 320 349
96 83 4,140 39 348 300
97 53 4,691 40 304 310
98 50 5,261 40 303 230
99 88 5,526 40 303 155
00 33 6,316 48 447 261
01 32 7,231 47 469 427
02 n.a n.a n.a 515 591
03 n.a n.a n.a 628 340
04 n.a n.a n.a 680 418
Sources: von Ungern-Sternberg (2004) and CCR (2003, 2005). Due to the di¤erent years covered by the
various sources, not all information is available over the full period.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium areas for generalist and specialist equilibria.
Parameter values: H=100,000, =0.2, f=100, F=200, =1.
Figure 2: degree of risk selection and prots of reinsurer.
Parameter values as in Figure 1.
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